On October 4th, 2014 Stratpass published concise, stopgap recommendations for US Ebola prevention policy in the Denver Post, as follows (with underlined modifiers):
All non-essential, untraced passenger travel from the Ebola outbreak zone should be banned. All essential relief travel must be screened, and livable, isolated staging areas set up by the CDC and Department of Homeland Security to observe would-be U.S. entrants until after the incubation period for the Ebola virus has passed.
Today, October 23, 2014, nineteen days after Stratpass recommendations were published in Denver Post, CBS reported the following:
It’s a start, however, a study published October 21st at The Lancet found that prophylactic screening in West African Ebola-zone airports would be the best preventive-screening approach to avert new outbreaks enabled by air travel. Stratpass Corp. issued that same recommendation on October 4th. The Lancet model predicted a average of 5 Ebola-infected travelers leaving Monrovia’s airport per month. That means that some months, it could be more. Loopholes remain. A non-cooperative, or ill-willed individual, for example, evading screening, could go Ebola-AWOL, whatever the motive. Therefore, the current policy remains a defective national security and epidemic policy, eschewing surer prevention and inviting more fronts on which to expensively and hurriedly try to contain the disease. As the US forms and reforms its approach, it is not bad that it is adaptive. However, it must major in preventive-adaptive, not reactive-adaptive, to be truly sound public health policy. A cost-benefit analysis encompassing the cost and resource tie-ups flowing from the Thomas Eric Duncan case alone, should make prevention the leading actor, and control, a supporting player.